

國立交通大學

電信工程研究所

碩士論文

應用於多重拜占庭開放線段缺陷上以整數線性  
規劃為基礎的錯誤診斷方法設計

Integer-Linear-Programming (ILP) Based  
Diagnosis of Multiple Byzantine  
Open-Segment Defects

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
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## 摘 要

開放線段缺陷所表現的錯誤決定於拜占庭效應和實體電路的繞線情形。拜占庭效應使得錯誤表現會依據模組和實體電路的資訊而變化，所以傳統的自動模組產生器在確保缺陷錯誤的啟動與傳遞上顯得相當困難。這篇論文提供了三階段的診斷方法設計用於自動尋找開放線段的組合。路徑回溯技巧幫助我們從錯誤模組中擷取所有可能存在開放線段的位置。整數線性規劃工具則根據可能的錯誤點和模擬結果列舉所有線路錯誤組合。最後，錯誤模擬則刪除不符合的組合幫助我們找到實際符合錯誤效應的線段組合。對 ISCAS85 電路注入多重開放線段缺陷的實驗結果顯示出此方法的分辨率相當有效，且可以產生小於 9 組的診斷率高的錯誤組合。

# Integer-Linear-Programming (ILP) Based Diagnosis of Multiple Byzantine Open-Segment Defects

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The faulty responses of an open defect are determined by the Byzantine effect and the physical routing. The Byzantine effect makes such faulty behaviors non-deterministic and depends upon both the pattern and physical information. Therefore, traditional ATPG has difficulty on its fault activation and propagation. This paper proposes a three-stage diagnosis approach of finding combinations of open-segment defects automatically. Path tracing technique helps extract all candidate fault sites from error outputs of failing patterns. An ILP solver enumerates all net fault by considering fault candidates and simulation responses. Last, fault simulation identifies true open-segment faults by pruning false cases. Experimental results shows the resolution of the proposed approach is high and only generates <9 faults with good diagnosability on all ISCAS 85 circuits under multiple injected open-segment defects.

## 誌 謝

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
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# Chapter 1

## Introduction



Failure analysis is critical for the yield improvement of manufacturing integrated circuits (ICs) and collects and analyzes data to determine the cause of failures. In a typical failure analysis flow, diagnosis is the process of locating the possible faults as defects and these locations can be inspected on the silicon for further physical repair. However, along with the process technology advances, failure mechanisms such as electromigration and stress voiding result in intricate and dynamic faulty phenomena on ICs and jointly make deterministic fault models such as stuck-at faults no longer effective. Therefore, many advanced fault models arise to properly describe the underlying behaviors. Open defects, the unintended breaks or electrical discontinuities in interconnects, are one category of the most important production defects and become more vulnerable to the failure mechanisms for the deep submicron regime. Hence, the impact of failure mechanisms needs to be considered during the diagnosis of open defects.

Open defects can be further classified into *intra-gate opens* and *inter-gate opens*. Intra-gate opens can be regarded as an open with an infinite resistance that disconnects the charge path or discharge path to the gate output whereas intra-gate opens are often regarded as stuck-open faults. Inter-gate opens have significant influences on signal propagation through interconnects and can be further classified into two types: (1) *resistive open* and (2) *complete open*. Fig. 1.1 illustrates the two types of inter-gate open defects. *Resistive opens* are also known as *weak opens* under which the current still passes through the narrow open defects due to the tunneling effect. *Complete opens*, on the other hand, are often termed *strong opens* which make the driven gates of the net float. Hence, the voltage at the floating net is hard to predict. According to [6] [16], the majority of open defects are of the inter-gate type and a high percentage of the known open defects in metal lines belong to strong opens. Therefore, complete opens are the target defects studied in this paper.

Due to the lower power supply and closer wires in the deep submicron regime, parasitic capacitances have greater impact to circuits and induce more complicated circuit behaviors. One of them is open segment where the faulty values on its downstream gates need to consider the impact of *Byzantine effect* [1] [2]. The Byzantine effect manifests Byzantine failures, in which components of a system fail in arbitrary ways. It denotes that the coupling of the neighboring nodes for a floating node determines its voltage value. and the logic values of its downstream gates are decided by comparing the current voltage with




Figure 1.1: Two types of inter-gate open defects

respective threshold values. As result, the open-segment faults in the presence of Byzantine effect become dynamic failures and diagnosis of Byzantine open-segment faults requires the assistance of layout information and the cell library.

From a logical view, when a net that drives multiple gates is open, all of its downstream gates have faulty values. However, from a physical view, such a logical net can be further divided into multiple segments on the circuit layout where each segment can drive one or multiple gates. For example, gate  $G1$  driving gate  $G2$ ,  $G3$  and  $G4$  through a logical net is illustrated in Fig. 1.2(a). If an open occurs on the net and then a fault is generated, all downstream gates,  $G2$ ,  $G3$  and  $G4$ , receive faulty values. However, considering the physical routing as shown in Fig. 1.2(b), the net can be divided into five segments with six aggressors and their respective coupling capacitances. Segment  $A$  drives  $G2$ ,  $G3$  and  $G4$ . Segment  $B$  drives  $G2$  and  $G3$ . Segment  $C$  drives  $G2$ . Segment  $D$  drives  $G3$ . Segment  $E$  drives  $G4$ . An open that occurs on different segments under different coupling conditions can result in different faulty behaviors. If the corresponding floating-node voltage is larger than the threshold value of the downstream gate, the input to the downstream gate receives logic 1. Otherwise, it receives logic 0. Last, the logic value on the driving gate decides if a faulty value is generated on the respective driven gate. To take Fig. 1.2(b) for example, if an open occurs on segment  $A$  and the coupling condition results in a floating-node voltage larger than the threshold voltages of  $G2$  and  $G4$  but smaller than that of  $G3$ , then  $G2$ ,  $G3$  and  $G4$  will receive logic 1, logic 0 and logic 1, respectively. If  $G1$  has logic 0, then the open on segment  $A$  generates two faults on  $G2$  and  $G4$ .





Figure 1.2: A net with three-fanout gate

Since different combinations of values on coupling nets result in different floating-node voltages, open-segment defects depend on physical information such as the layout and cell library and traditional physically-independent diagnosis cannot work well on this problem. Moreover, when multiple open defects occur physically, single-location-at-a-time (SLAT) patterns cannot differentiate the output responses under the single defect assumption from the ones under the multiple, simultaneously-active defect assumption. Therefore, our diagnosis intends to fully utilize patterns and their output responses. The failing pattern set is first used to identify the possible segments that can cause the faulty output responses with open defects. Later, the passing pattern set takes a role of eliminating false candidates. On the basis of the idea, an integer-linear-programming(ILP) based approach is developed to formulate the relationship between patterns and responses and to further explore the segment combinations as defects. Our objective of the proposed ILP based approach is to find segment combinations that have the fewest defects to precisely explain responses for all passing and failing patterns.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we will review the diagnosis and discuss different approaches of previous researches. The open-segment fault model will be elaborated in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 outlines the proposed three-stage ILP-based diagnosis flow and details the stage of fault-site identification, fault-combination genera-

tion and fault-simulation validation. Experimental results of applying the proposed flow are presented and cross compare the results of using the random and 5-detect patterns in Chapter 5. Conclusions and future work are discussed in Chapter 6.



## **Chapter 2**

### **Previous Researches**



For interconnect open defects, many researches have been done about diagnosis and ATPG approach. To deal with the voltage prediction on the floating node, physical information and Byzantine effect estimation are considered. To diagnose multiple open defects, several approaches are reviewed. Traditional diagnosis approaches for multiple stuck-at faults cannot work well when undeterministic faulty behaviors by Byzantine effect appear. Different patterns may induce different faulty behaviors. Therefore, several approaches for diagnosing multiple defects without assuming a fault model are proposed. Finally, we will also discuss some diagnosis approaches focus on multiple open defects.

Shi-Yu Huang proposes a single open-segment fault diagnosis approach [1] [20]. Candidates are collected from structural analysis. Wei Zou et al. also propose a diagnosis approach for interconnect open defect considering routing topology and coupling capacitance to estimate Byzantine effect [2]. Both works use the inject-and-evaluate paradigm for open defects since their faulty behavior are not consistent. S. M. Reddy et al. proposes a gate-level fault model for interconnect opens whose number grows exponentially in terms of the fanout size [27]. They consider primary output information, and apply implicit enumeration of faults and explicit fault simulation to decrease the number of fault that need to be considered.

Several other researches are denoted to test generation for interconnect open defects. S. Spinner et al. propose an algorithm to generate test patterns for an open defect considering physical information and Byzantine effect [14]. They apply an aggressor selection to force the signals on aggressors for fault activation and verify the existence of a pattern for fault propagation. X. Lin et al. discuss all test generation strategy for all types of open defects [10]. S. Hillbert et al. use segment stuck-at faults to generate test patterns for interconnect open defects [26]. In addition, untestability analysis is applied to identify which faults are not testable.

Multiple-defect diagnosis of failing ICs is more important along with the ever increasing number of gates and density of the circuits. Multiple open-segment fault diagnosis is more complex since two faults may have crosstalk with each other. When the faulty behavior due to a open defect is determined by its neighboring nodes, its neighboring node may also affected by another open defect. Single open-segment fault diagnosis sometimes has a problem to describe a circuit under such circumstance. It is required to design a new


approach to diagnose multiple open segment defects.

T. Bartenstein et al. propose an approach to diagnose multiple stuck-at faults. SLAT patterns assumes that only one defect occurs on one single location at one time. By observing simulation of SLAT patterns, multiplets are collected as the potential faults. In [5] [19] SLAT patterns are also used to facilitate diagnose multiple faults. However, SLAT patterns needs to perform *equivalent fault* evaluation that is also hard for open-segment defects. SLAT patterns can no longer guarantee the activation of the faulty behavior and the propagation for each defect. Furthermore, faulty behaviors of open-segment defects vary under different patterns. Z. Wang et al. explore the relationships between patterns and diagnosability [25]. They use a ATPG tool to generate patterns for stuck-at fault. Their results reveals that the diagnosability is improved by providing patterns of better quality. However, n-detect patterns has not yet been explored on open-segment defects. We will conduct the experiments to observe the diagnosability of oepn-segment defect between random pattern and n-detect pattern.

X. Wen et al. [9] propose a diagnosis approach for physical defects with unnown behaviors on logic level. They use a  $X$ -fault model for diagnosis via  $X$ -injection and simulation. Yu and Blanton propose a multiple defect diagnosis without a fault model by only observing failing pattern characteristics [3]. Path-based site elimination helps to reduce the number of candidate sites. J. Brandon Liu et al. propose an incremental diagnosis of multiple open interconnects [8]. A list of fault tuples is found to explain all EPOs after  $X$ 's are injected on candidate sites and implication is performed. However, for open-segment faults, the implication is inaccurate on nets whose some fanouts have faulty value while others have correct value due to Byzantine effect. R. Rodriguez-Montanes et al. used a logic-based diagnosis tool (Faloc) to diagnose open defect [24]. Then they presented a ranking based on the quiescent current consumption of the circuit under test.


Open segments are often modeled as interconnect open defects [2] [8] [12] [14] because interconnects are the most convenient locations to be open. However, those diagnosis approaches focus on either single defect assumption [1] [2] [20] or work at only logic level [8] [9] [12] [18]. Therefore, in this work, we propose a new approach which considers the Byzantine effect for diagnosing multiple open-segment defects. Since the faulty behavior due to multiple open-segment defects depends on both the input pattern and the

physical information, it is necessary to incorporate the circuit layout and the cell library in our approach.



## **Chapter 3**

# **Fault Model of Open Segments**



Several fault models of open defects has already been proposed in previous researches [2] [14] [22]. In this paper, we target the fault model that describes an open on one segment of the net considering the impact of physical information. When a segment of one net is open, the node  $f$  on the floating side is regarded as an *open-segment* fault. The logic value of the floating node  $f$  is determined by the floating node voltage and the threshold voltage of the driven gates. If the floating node voltage is larger than the threshold voltage of a driven gate, the logic value for the driven gate is logic 1; otherwise, it is logic 0. Therefore, not all driven gates of a floating node have faulty values.




Figure 3.1: Fault model for an open defect

As shown in Fig. 3.1, the floating node voltage  $V_f$  needs to satisfy the following equation:

$$V_f = V_{dd} \times \frac{C_1}{C_0 + C_1} + \frac{Q_t}{C_{gnd}} \quad (3.1)$$

where  $Q_t$  is the initial trapped charge of the floating node and  $C_{gnd}$  is the capacitance between floating node and ground.  $C_0$  and  $C_1$  are the sum of the capacitances with logic 1 and logic 0, respectively. Furthermore, the values of  $C_0$  and  $C_1$  can be decomposed into:

$$C_0 = C_{gnd} + C_{n0} + C_{i0} \quad (3.2)$$

$$C_1 = C_{vdd} + C_{n1} + C_{i1} \quad (3.3)$$

where  $C_{vdd}$  and  $C_{gnd}$  are the capacitances between the floating node and the power, and between the floating and the ground, respectively.  $C_{n0}$  and  $C_{n1}$  are the capacitances between floating node and its neighboring node with logic 0 and logic 1, respectively.  $C_{i0}$  and  $C_{i1}$  are the internal capacitances and reside inside the driven gate. Because  $C_{n0}$  and

$C_{n1}$  dominate the major part of fault behavior, we only observe the coupling effect from  $C_{n0}$  and  $C_{n1}$ .

However, trapped charge  $Q_t$  and internal capacitances,  $C_{i0}$  and  $C_{i1}$  are typically hard to predict. Process variation also makes parasitic capacitances extracted from physical layout unpredictable. Therefore, this paper adopts a simplified model similar to [10] [14] by assuming that the parasitic capacitances between the open net and its neighboring nets dominate the decision of the logic value on the floating node.





Figure 3.2: Byzantine effect

Given a floating node and its down-stream gates, if  $V_f > V_{threshold}$ , the floating node  $f$  is regarded as with logic 1. Otherwise, it is with logic 0. For example, in Fig. 3.2(a), suppose that  $V_{t2}$ ,  $V_{t3}$  and  $V_{t4}$  are the threshold voltages for G2, G3 and G4, respectively. Assume that  $V_{t4} < V_{t3} < V_f < V_{t2}$ , if segment #1 is open and, then G3 and G4 are logic-0 where G2 is logic-1. If the segment #2 is open in Fig. 3.1(b) with the same voltage condition, G2 and G3 are logic-1 and logic-0, respectively, where G4 maintains the original correct value. For segment #1, the possible fault behavior is (G2, G3, G4), (G3, G4), and (G4) while for segment #2 is (G2, G3) and (G3). Therefore, different segments result in different fault behaviors. For an open-segment fault, the exact faulty behavior needs to consider the logic values of coupling wires.

Under the assumption of multiple faults in a circuit, if one open-segment fault is activated under a pattern, the fault may become masked due to the logic value of its neighbor-

ing node is replaced by a faulty value. It is also possible that an inactive fault is activated by another fault. Fault masking effect is complicated and will be discussed in Section 5. Because the activation of an open defect requires specific assignments of signals on neighboring nets, fault equivalence needs a robust and rigorous definition in order to perform fault collapsing. Therefore, for simplicity, each open-segment fault is treated as an independent fault and has no equivalent fault. As result, the total number of open-segment faults is the number of segments of each net in the circuit.




## **Chapter 4**

### **Three-Stage**

### **Integer-Linear-Programming (ILP)**

### **Based Diagnosis**






Figure 4.1: Three-stage ILP-based diagnosis flow

Having the open segment fault model, the next step is to find the set of faults that match the simulation results with respect to the given patterns. Therefore, a three-stage diagnosis approach is proposed to determine the number of faults and the corresponding segment combinations. Figure 4.1 shows the overall flow of the proposed approach that consists of three stages: the first one is *net fault identification*; the second one is *N-net fault generation*; the third one is *N-segment fault composition*. Net fault identification is developed based on typical logical filtering of candidate sites [1] [8] [18]. Then, by encoding the candidate nets as a binary-integer-programming (BIP) problem, a ILP solver incrementally finds net combinations as *N-net faults* where  $N$  starts from 1. If no net combination can be found to correctly explain the patterns expressed by the ILP constraints,  $N$  increments by 1 until a feasible solution is found. In the third stage, logical pruning by symbolic  $X$  simulation first reduces the size of *N-segment faults*. Later, the injection of

opens on segments with the support of physical information ensures that the remaining  $N$ -segment faults can result in the correct behaviors on the circuit under all patterns and thus requires further inspection on silicon.

## 4.1 Net Fault Identification

The first stage of the proposed diagnosis flow generates a list of candidate nets as faults. Each candidate in the list is called a *net fault*. The initial *net-fault* list is done by the path-tracing technique. Path tracing starts from an erroneous primary output (EPO) of one failing pattern. Nets are identified as defect locations and stored into a list of candidates during this stage. This process iterates to update the net-fault list for each EPO until failing patterns are fully explored.

Backtracking algorithm runs for all failing patterns for path tracing. For each EPO, it traces the circuit backward to find the net on which an open can account for the output mismatch. If multiple fanins of a gate have controlling values, only those controlling fanin nets are considered and collected as net faults. If all fanins are non-controlling, all fanin nets are collected and the backtracking continues to run on each fanin net. Fig. 4.2 shows an example where the path tracing starts from net  $H$ . Considering the controlling values on both fanins of gate 5, net  $F$  and net  $G$  are net-fault candidates and stored in the list. For net  $G$ , both fanins are also collected because net  $B$  and net  $E$  have non-controlling values.

For a net  $i$ ,  $w_i = 1$  is labeled if an open occurring on net  $i$  can **fully** explain one EPO. But if  $0 < w_i < 1$  is labeled, an open on net  $i$  can **partially** explain one EPO. When path tracing starts from one EPO, it is assigned the full weight 1. Given a specific weight  $w$  for the net connecting the output of a gate, if all inputs of the gate have non-controlling values (*cv*'s), all nets connecting its inputs are assigned weight  $w$ . When the gate has  $k$  simultaneous controlling-value inputs, the weight is split and each net connecting one input receives  $w/k$ . In summary, when a net receives multiple weight assignments from different branches, the total sum of all weights will be its final weight.

To give an example, a circuit under test is shown in Fig. 4.2 with the logic-value assignments on all gates. Path tracing starts from net  $H$  with weight  $w_H=1$ . Because both




Figure 4.2: An illustrative example for path tracing and weight assignment

net  $F$  and net  $G$  have controlling values to the gate connecting net  $H$ ,  $w_F = w_G = 1/2 = 0.5$ . Similarly for net  $F$ , considering that both net  $D$  and net  $E$  have controlling values,  $w_D = w_{E_1} = w_F/2 = 0.25$ . However,  $w_{E_2} = w_B = w_G = 0.5$  since both net  $E$  and net  $B$  have non-controlling values to the gate connecting net  $G$ . Therefore,  $w_E = w_{E_1} + w_{E_2} = 0.5 + 0.25 = 0.75$ . As a result,  $w_A=0.25$ ,  $w_B=0.5$ ,  $w_C=0.75$ ,  $w_D=0.25$ ,  $w_E=0.75$ ,  $w_F=0.5$ ,  $w_G=0.5$  and  $w_H=1$ .

## 4.2 $N$ -net Fault Generation

The candidate list extracted from the first stage only collects the net-fault candidates labeled with weights as the capability of correctly explaining EPOs under one failing pattern. In the second stage, we further explore the multiplets of net faults that can fully explain all EPOs under all failing patterns simultaneously. Note that a multiplet of  $k$  net faults is termed a  $N$ -net fault hereafter.

The weight assignment for each candidate now takes into play and transforms the search of combinations of net faults into a BIP problem. For example, given three EPOs under one failing pattern with the candidate list  $L_1$ ,  $L_2$  and  $L_3$  extracted from the first stage:

$$\begin{aligned}
 L_1 &= \{A, B, C, E\} && \text{for } EPO_1 \\
 L_2 &= \{B, E\} && \text{for } EPO_2 \\
 L_3 &= \{A, D\} && \text{for } EPO_3
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $A$ ,  $B$ ,  $C$ ,  $D$  and  $E$  are nets of the circuit.

To further decide the size  $N$  and the set of  $N$ -net faults that can fully explain all EPOs, the corresponding BIP problem can be expressed into:

$$\begin{aligned} n_A + n_B + n_C + n_E &\geq 1 \\ n_B + n_E &\geq 1 \\ n_A + n_D &\geq 1 \end{aligned}$$

where all net variables,  $n_A, n_B, n_C, n_D$  and  $n_E$ , are binary and represent if an open occurs on net  $A, B, C, D$  and  $E$ , respectively. Besides, another constraint equation denoting the assumption for the size of  $N$  is also added as follows.

$$n_A + n_B + n_C + n_D + n_E = N$$

The above equation enforces that exact  $N$  opens can occur on net  $A$  to net  $E$  simultaneously.

The BIP problem is solvable and has at least one  $N$ -net fault if some of net variables are 1. These variables jointly form the multiplet of a fault that can correctly explain EPOs under all failing patterns. The ILP solver starts to find solutions from  $N = 1$ . If no feasible solution can be found,  $N$  increments by 1 until one solution is found. For the example in Fig. 4.2, no multiplet of  $N = 1$  can be found and hence the ILP solver steps to  $N = 2$ . As result, four 2-net faults,  $(A, B)$ ,  $(A, E)$ ,  $(B, D)$  and  $(D, E)$  are found.

To further eliminate the faults that cannot perfectly explain all failing patterns, the weights of the candidates are added as the additional constraint equations during the BIP solving. Therefore, given the set  $S$  of  $N$ -net faults for all EPOs, the BIP problem can be updated as follows:

$$\sum_{n_i \in S} w_i \times n_i \geq 1 \quad (4.1)$$

$$\sum_{n_i \in S} n_i = N \quad (4.2)$$

where each EPO under one failing pattern corresponds to one constraint equation represented by (4.1). After applying the ILP solver, all  $N$ -net faults that can correctly explaining all failing patterns are reported. Note that repeated constraints are first removed from the constraint equations to reduce the runtime of the solution generation.

For example, according to the result of path tracing in Fig. 4.2, the boundary inequality equation for such pattern can be expressed into:

$$w_A n_A + w_B n_B + w_C n_C + w_D n_D + w_E n_E + w_F n_F + w_G n_G + w_H n_H \geq 1$$

where  $n_A, n_B, n_C, n_D, n_E, n_F, n_G, n_H$  are all binary and  $w_A = 0.25, w_B = 0.5, w_C = 0.75, w_D = 0.25, w_E = 0.75, w_F = 0.5, w_G = 0.5$  and  $w_H = 1$ . More inequality equations can be added if other failing patterns are provided. At last, the equation denoting the size  $N$  of fault multiplets is also added:

$$n_A + n_B + n_C + n_D + n_E + n_F + n_G + n_H = N$$

where exact  $N$  opens can occur among net  $A, B, C, D, E, F, G$  and  $H$  under all failing patterns.

These equations and weight assignments effectively limit the total number of solutions reported by the ILP solver. However, when reconvergences of multiple faults occurs in the circuit with respect to one failing pattern, the  $N$ -net fault found by the ILP solver may no longer correctly explain the reconvergent scenario. To take Fig. 4.2 for example, based on the previous constraint,  $(B, E)$  has the weighted sum 1.75 and can be reported as one 2-net faults by the ILP solver. However, under the failing pattern, an EPO occurring on net  $H$  depends on the propagation of multiple faulty values through the nets connecting inputs of gate 3 and gate 5. opens on  $(B, E)$  fails to create a faulty value on net  $D$  connecting the input of gate 3 and thus no fault can be propagated to net  $F$  and net  $H$  will not be one EPO.

To avoid generating such **redundant** faults, constraints called *fault-propagation trees* (f.p.t.) are further added for better guiding the BIP solving.


*Definition:* A *fault-propagation tree*  $t_j^i$  is a tree for traces of signal propagations and traverses backwards in the circuit topology under one failing pattern. Its root locates the net  $j$  connecting the input of a *controlling-reconvergent* gate  $i$  and each of its leaves locates a PI or a net connecting the output of another controlling-reconvergent gate. Here a *controlling-reconvergent* gate denotes the gate with multiple inputs of simultaneously controlling values under the pattern.

Fault-propagation trees are described as individual constraints and each can be formulated into:

$$\sum_{n_k \in t_j^i} n_k \leq N - 1 \quad (4.3)$$

where net  $k$  is one net of the fault-propagation tree  $t_j^i$ . Note that if  $t_j^i$  consists of only one net, the constraint is of no use and need not to be added in the BIP problem.

Each of the above constraints means that at most  $(N - 1)$  defects can occur in  $t_j^i$  and leaves one defect in another fault-propagation tree of gate  $i$ . To take Fig. 4.2 for example again, gate 5 is one controlling-reconvergent gate and faulty values need to propagate through both net  $F$  and net  $G$  to result in an EPO on net  $H$ . Therefore, path tracing ends up with finding constraints for  $t_F^5$  and  $t_G^5$ . In Fig. 4.3(a), since gate 3 is also one controlling-reconvergent gate, the constraint for  $t_F^5$  with only net  $F$  need not to be generated but two following constraints for  $t_D^3$  and  $t_E^3$  are added accordingly. In Fig. 4.3(c), path tracing finds net  $B$ ,  $C$ ,  $E$  and  $G$ , for  $t_G^5$  in a backward manner. As result, the equations for all f.p.t. constraints are formulated as:



$$\begin{aligned} n_A + n_D &\leq N - 1 \\ n_C + n_E &\leq N - 1 \\ n_B + n_C + n_E + n_G &\leq N - 1 \end{aligned}$$

After adding these b.f.t. constraints, redundant faults such as  $\{B, E\}$  will not be reported by the ILP solver.

Considering the physical layout, each net in one  $N$ -net fault may consist of multiple segments and thus the size of  $N$ -segment faults can grow exponentially. For example, if a 3-net fault  $\{A, B, C\}$  that can be physically divided into segment set  $\{A_1, A_2, A_3\}$ ,  $\{B_1, B_2\}$  and  $\{C_1, C_2, C_3\}$ , respectively, the total number of 3-segment faults corresponding to this fault is  $3 \times 2 \times 3 = 18$ . To avoid the exponential growth on the size of  $N$ -segment faults, a  **$X$ -inject-and-evaluate** approach is first applied in step 1 and logically prune the false cases of  $N$ -net faults.

Symbolic  $X$  simulation is a common technique used in fault diagnosis and our  $X$ -inject-and-evaluate approach can be viewed as an extension of this technique.  $X$ 's are assigned on each net in one  $N$ -net fault and propagate towards the outputs simultaneously.






Figure 4.3: Path tracing of fault-propagation trees

If  $X$ 's cannot be observed at all EPOs under one failing pattern, then this  $N$ -net fault is a false case and should be removed. Fig. 4.4 illustrates two examples for the  $X$ -inject-and-evaluate approach. In Fig. 4.4(a), suppose that 2-net fault  $(E,G)$  is the target. After  $X$ 's are injected on  $E$  and  $G$ , one  $X$  is blocked at gate 3 due to the controlling-value side-input connecting  $D$ . Therefore,  $X$  cannot be observed on the only EPO (net  $H$ ) and thus  $(E,G)$  is removed. In Figure 4.4(b),  $X$ 's are injected on  $B$  and  $F$  and can successfully result in one  $X$  on net  $H$ . Therefore, 2-net fault  $(B,F)$  is kept.



(a) 2-net fault {E,G}



(b) 2-net fault {B,F}

Figure 4.4: Two examples for X-inject-and-evaluate

### 4.3 $N$ -segment Fault Composition

During this stage,  $N$ -net faults are further verified and expanded into  $N$ -segment faults via three steps. In step 1, false net faults can be removed accordingly. Considering the layout of the circuit, the remaining nets of  $N$ -net faults are broken into individual segment lists that are used to compose the corresponding  $N$ -segment faults. In step 2, a physical pruning proceeds in step 1 and eliminates  $N$ -segment faults that cannot perfectly explain output responses of all patterns through fault simulation with the support of physical information.

After applying  $X$ -inject-and-evaluate, step 1 starts to enumerate a list of segments for each net in the  $N$ -net faults and composes the  $N$ -segment faults from the segment lists. Before enumerating all  $N$ -segment faults from all segments of  $N$ -net faults, physical pruning helps to eliminate the false open segments. To further illustrate the physical pruning in

step 1, let's use the circuit layout shown in Fig. 1.2(b) again. Suppose two faulty values appear on G3 and G4 under one failing pattern. Since an open on segment  $B$ ,  $C$  or  $D$  can never result in a faulty value on G4 and an open on segment  $E$  can never result in a faulty value on G3, segment  $A$  is the only candidate on which an open can result in faulty values on G3 and G4 simultaneously. Therefore, the segment list for this net only contains  $\{A\}$ .

Finally, step 2 verifies if each  $N$ -segment fault can result in correct output responses under both failing and passing patterns. Such verification is done by the fault simulation with the support of physical information such as the circuit layout and the cell library. One  $N$ -segment fault will be removed if injecting opens on all segments in this fault cannot result in the matching trace of signal propagation under one either failing or passing pattern. Finally, the remaining segments in  $N$ -segment faults are treated as the true defect locations for silicon inspection.

When a segment fault are injected into the circuit, the fault on the site will take routing topology of the net, coupling capacitance, and threshold voltage of its driven gate into concern. After a pattern assigned, floating voltage is estimated by equation 3.1. Then, the floating voltage is compared with the threshold voltage of driven gates to check if the fault is propagated through the driven gates. For example, as shown in Figure 1.2, assume that a fault injected on segment  $A$ . The coupling nets with logic 1 are  $n_2$ ,  $n_3$ , and  $n_6$  while  $n_1$ ,  $n_4$ , and  $n_5$  are logic 0. Therefore,  $C_1 = cc_2 + cc_3 + cc_6$  and  $C_0 = cc_1 + cc_4 + cc_5$ . If the output response mismatches, the  $N$ -segment fault will be eliminated.

## 4.4 Performance Comparison of Applied Constraints

During this section, the performance of applying the different constraint combinations for BIP solving is studied and Table 4.1 shows preliminary results on three small ISCAS benchmark circuits with the injection of two open defects.

The first column shows the circuit name and the second column shows the combinations of applied constraints where  $or$ ,  $wa$  and  $fp$  denotes the original, weight-assignment and fault-propagation-tree constraints, respectively. The third, fourth and fifth column show the total number of  $N$ -net faults that a ILP solver CPLEX generates, the total number of  $N$ -net

Table 4.1: Comparison of Applied Constraints for BIP Solving

<i>ckt</i>	<i>const.</i>	$\#Nnf_1$	$\#Nnf_2$	$\#Nsf$	time (s)
c432	<i>or</i>	272.65	140.14	591.64	1.27
	<i>or+wa</i>	139.07	77.43	424.39	0.69
	<i>or+wa+fp</i>	92.10	62.01	310.99	0.74
c499	<i>or</i>	2528.41	292.59	2726.64	11.17
	<i>or+wa</i>	487.54	256.65	2157.73	2.45
	<i>or+wa+fp</i>	436.66	182.13	1504.51	1.94
c880	<i>or</i>	418.57	136.60	1353.36	2.00
	<i>or+wa</i>	221.20	130.47	1303.53	1.62
	<i>or+wa+fp</i>	198.90	108.94	821.64	1.53

faults after applying  $X$ -inject-and-evaluate, and the total number of  $N$ -segment faults at the end, respectively. The last column shows the runtime for  $N$ -net fault generation. As we can see, both weight-assignment and fault-propagation-tree constraints effectively reduce the total number of  $N$ -net faults as well as that of  $N$ -segment faults. Moreover, they also help reduce the runtime for  $N$ -net fault generation.

# Chapter 5

## Experimental Results




Table 5.1: Circuit Information

Circuit	$\#net$	$\#m - fnet$	$\#seg.$
c432	203	89	443
c499	275	59	566
c880	468	125	979
c1355	619	259	1404
c1908	938	385	1893
c2670	1642	454	2821
c3540	1741	579	3781
c5315	2608	806	5878
c6288	2480	1456	6252
c7552	3828	1300	7990

The experiments are conducted on the ISCAS 85 benchmark circuits. The ISCAS 85 benchmark circuits, layouts and coupling capacitance information can be downloaded from TAMU website [23]. The ISCAS 85 benchmark circuits are manufactured with a 5-metal-layer TSMC 180 nm CMOS technology. Threshold voltage of each type of gate is determined from SPICE simulation. To solve BIP, we use an ILP solver CPLEX. CPLEX is one of the commercial tool of LP solvers that can allow to populate all possible solutions. Each experiment includes 100 sample circuits generated with the injection of different defect sizes under 1000 patterns. Here, we inject two types of patterns to observe the influence of pattern quality.

Table 5.1 shows the gate-level and physical information of ISCAS 85 circuit. The second row shows the total number of nets. The third row shows the number of net with multiple fanouts. The fourth shows the total number of segments enumerated from the circuits.

## 5.1 Results under Random Pattern

At first, experiments on the 100 sample circuits under 1000 random patterns is observed. Table 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 shows the result with injected random defect number  $N = 1, 2, 3, 4$  and  $5$ . The number of failing patterns is represented in the second row. The third row represents the number of constraints transformed from equation 4.1. The fourth row represents the number of fault propagation tree constraints. The fifth row shows the number of net fault collected from *net fault identification*. The sixth row shows the number of  $N$ -net fault generated from  *$N$ -net fault generation*. The seventh row shows the number of  $N$ -segment fault composed from  *$N$ -segment fault composition*.

Although hundreds of random patterns are failing patterns, there are only few constraints generated from equation 4.1. The random patterns didn't offer enough information of segment defects that may cause low diagnosability. Diagnosability means the ratio the number of detected fault to the number of injected fault. We will check the diagnosability of random patterns later by comparing it with the diagnosability of 5-detect patterns. During  $N$ -net fault generation, it also shows the problem that large number of fault propagation tree constraints are generated. It will cause an overhead on time if reduction of redundant f.p.t constraints is performed while the large number of the constraints might also cause an overhead on BIP solving time. However, compared with overhead on BIP solving time, overhead on constraint reduction time is more critical. The results shows  $<16$  of  $N$ -segment fault are reported in average. In general, the reported number of  $N$ -segment fault is not large.

## 5.2 Results under 5-detect Pattern

To expect a higher diagnosability, we try to use 5-detect patterns generated from a commercial tool. The experiments under 1000 patterns with 5-detect patterns are conducted. Table 5.7 shows the number of 5-detect patterns generated from the commercial tool. Table 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12 shows the experimental result with injected random defect number = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 with 5-detect patterns.

Experiments under 5-detect patterns shows more failing patterns and constraints that

Table 5.2:  $N=1$  under 1000 random patterns

ckt	#fpttn	#eq(4) const	#fpt const	#nf	#Nnf	#Nsf	CPUtime
c432	314.3	23.1	695107.5	137.7	13.5	2.2	0.7
c499	151.5	6.7	41609.8	140.0	49.2	2.9	2.1
c880	325.0	11.3	184720.8	97.6	17.4	2.1	1.5
c1355	218.2	8.7	62897.9	334.8	96.9	8.3	2.5
c1908	285.0	13.4	91843.9	522.4	61.6	4.3	6.9
c2670	247.8	9.7	253430.2	174.6	57.8	3.4	5.8
c3540	161.8	14.9	1122794.0	729.5	78.8	3.0	13.8
c5315	163.0	9.2	122795.9	211.5	62.4	4.0	20.2
c6288	236.2	14.7	1054766.8	1269.4	573.7	1.8	45.3
c7552	204.6	11.9	312881.7	398.3	84.4	2.4	13.2
<b>avg</b>	<b>230.7</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>394284.8</b>	<b>405.9</b>	<b>109.6</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>11.2</b>

Table 5.3:  $N=2$  under 1000 random patterns

ckt	#fpttn	#eq(4) const	#fpt const	#nf	#Nnf	#Nsf	CPUtime
c432	323.7	25.9	15025.2	137.8	186.7	2.6	2.9
c499	218.4	10.4	74704.2	151.2	307.2	3.6	12.6
c880	394.6	14.8	233257.8	128.6	133.4	3.2	3.8
c1355	436.8	8.6	33911.2	288.8	476.1	7.7	53.5
c1908	385.8	10.2	75374.6	538.5	1431.2	6.4	263.9
c2670	255.1	6.5	23609.8	227.6	181.5	4.5	57.5
c3540	205.8	12.1	103454.8	726.6	301.1	3.0	68.2
c5315	115.7	35.1	88578.8	387.9	768.6	2.2	158.2
c6288	270.5	33.3	949998.1	1743.7	1850.3	1.4	350.4
c7552	440.2	9.4	48506.1	586.3	1497.7	8.2	238.2
<b>avg</b>	<b>304.7</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>791420.5</b>	<b>491.7</b>	<b>713.4</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>89.4</b>

Table 5.4:  $N=3$  under 1000 random patterns

ckt	#fpttn	#eq(4) const	#fpt const	#nf	#Nnf	#Nsf	CPUtime
c432	408.1	27.9	16187.8	148.6	89.8	2.2	2.8
c499	381.4	16.1	3137.6	140.7	81.6	3.3	28.7
c880	698.2	35.2	13337.3	202.3	155.8	7.0	24.2
c1355	308.3	13.1	2021.4	391.4	1014.8	5.2	159.5
c1908	381.3	15.2	14505.7	516.3	260.4	1.3	362.9
c2670	254.3	5.5	6839.5	284.8	779.9	1.5	369.7
c3540	199.5	13.2	18544.3	895.8	818.3	2.0	408.7
c5315	324.7	42.7	6921.6	310.8	4363.3	8.5	723.4
c6288	187.0	30.1	63512.0	1153.1	1178.5	1.6	1232.0
c7552	259.6	10.1	7843.2	421.0	8430.3	5.5	743.6
<b>avg</b>	<b>340.3</b>	<b>20.9</b>	<b>15285.0</b>	<b>446.5</b>	<b>1717.3</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>405.5</b>

Table 5.5:  $N=4$  under 1000 random patterns

ckt	# <i>fpttn</i>	# <i>eq(4) const</i>	# <i>fpt const</i>	# <i>n.f</i>	# <i>Nn.f</i>	# <i>Nsf</i>	<i>CPUtime</i>
c432	414.4	360.5	29856.5	195.1	37386.5	3.6	253.9
c499	372.4	255.1	5282.3	172.2	41977.6	5.7	572.2
c880	634.3	448.3	4062.0	189.2	4852.4	4.2	443.4
c1355	322.1	96.3	3194.7	429.9	4293.2	4.7	588.0
c1908	390.0	24.1	30151.1	533.4	11360.0	3.2	1523.9
c2670	281.3	117.7	7218.3	305.3	2139.5	4.1	977.2
c3540	124.0	24.7	16383.6	1051.7	13303.4	3.0	1055.5
c5315	391.7	159.4	5120.3	492.5	37237.8	6.0	2271.4
c6288	403.5	26.1	43103.5	1612.4	56130.3	2.8	4769.3
c7552	312.3	89.1	11357.0	566.3	30246.9	5.5	2691.6
<b>avg</b>	<b>364.6</b>	<b>160.1</b>	<b>11573.0</b>	<b>464.8</b>	<b>23892.7</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>1514.6</b>

Table 5.6:  $N=5$  under 1000 random patterns

ckt	# <i>fpttn</i>	# <i>eq(4) const</i>	# <i>fpt const</i>	# <i>n.f</i>	# <i>Nn.f</i>	# <i>Nsf</i>	<i>CPUtime</i>
c432	422.1	388.2	17327.6	188.3	2303.0	5.3	523.4
c499	382.7	213.6	6248.6	192.4	51296.6	13.7	1135.3
c880	658.3	401.1	8732.0	200.7	7892.3	6.2	622.2
c1355	331.6	133.6	2937.4	473.0	3376.4	6.5	733.6
c1908	362.5	37.5	22171.2	557.4	112374.1	10.3	11790.0
c2670	240.1	155.3	6293.8	352.2	8237.5	7.4	1531.6
c3540	239.2	52.3	10936.1	1167.9	32562.2	6.0	1922.1
c5315	417.2	157.0	4092.3	479.0	76237.2	7.3	3901.3
c6288	385.5	23.2	24967.8	1663.6	213968.3	15.3	15609.9
c7552	339.0	105.2	3825.6	592.2	137274.7	6.3	8832.6
<b>avg</b>	<b>377.8</b>	<b>166.7</b>	<b>10753.2</b>	<b>586.7</b>	<b>64552.2</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>3860.2</b>

Table 5.7: 5-Detect Stuck-at Pattern

Circuit	#5 - <i>dpttn.</i>	Circuit	#5 - <i>dpttn.</i>
c432	225	c2670	286
c499	267	c3540	528
c880	182	c5315	297
c1355	432	c6288	81
c1908	591	c7552	460

offers more information of open defects than under random patterns. The results also shows that the number of  $N$ -segment faults are  $< 9$  which is less than the results under random patterns. In most cases, the reported  $N$ -segment faults under 5-detect patterns are also less than under random patterns.

### 5.3 Diagnosability and Resolution Comparison

Results comparison between 5-detect pattern and random pattern of four circuits are being discussed. Resolution means the ratio the number of fault reported to the number of fault detected. Here, we define net resolution and segment resolution to discriminate the results of reported net and reported segment, respectively. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 shows the comparison of net resolution and segment resolution. Resolution under random patterns is generally higher than under 5-detect patterns. The results shows that we don't need the inspect many signal lines to find the open segment defects. The approach gives an accurate result to find segment defects.

Figure 5.3 shows the diagnosability comparison. Diagnosability under random patterns decreases quickly when open defect size  $N$  increases. With less constraints, random patterns offers less information of open defects. Therefore, pattern quality determines the diagnosability. The reason that the decreasing of diagnosability results from the activation and propagation of open segment faults. If the given patterns fails to expose the characteristics of all faults, only the subset of faults can be identified with limited information.

Table 5.8:  $N=1$  under 5-detect stuck-at patterns

ckt	# <i>fpttn</i>	# <i>eq(4) const</i>	# <i>fpt const</i>	# <i>n.f</i>	# <i>Nn.f</i>	# <i>Nsf</i>	<i>CPUtime</i>
c432	104.4	177.5	5030.2	170.0	11.0	1.7	0.27
c499	206.4	137.1	615.4	196.5	49.5	1.8	0.41
c880	252.0	129.8	2619.3	143.8	12.8	1.6	0.19
c1355	494.5	431.9	1922.1	508.0	33.3	1.5	2.77
c1908	555.2	844.0	27135.3	679.7	42.0	1.4	9.72
c2670	121.6	112.6	2678.1	538.2	50.4	2.6	1.07
c3540	187.8	299.3	23871.9	1245.1	27.4	1.7	7.52
c5315	149.2	217.1	3003.3	631.9	27.8	1.4	1.75
c6288	186.3	83.0	16566.0	1629.1	355.8	1.4	23.34
c7552	347.0	473.7	10632.4	869.1	42.4	1.4	7.06
<b>avg</b>	<b>260.4</b>	<b>290.6</b>	<b>9407.4</b>	<b>661.1</b>	<b>65.2</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>5.41</b>

Table 5.9:  $N=2$  under 5-detect stuck-at patterns

ckt	# <i>fpttn</i>	# <i>eq(4) const</i>	# <i>fpt const</i>	# <i>n.f</i>	# <i>N.n.f</i>	# <i>N.s.f</i>	<i>CPUtime</i>
c432	187.0	343.5	10751.0	180.4	186.5	2.4	7.0
c499	263.4	174.9	877.5	196.7	1817.4	2.3	70.2
c880	336.1	181.9	4391.5	167.6	98.9	2.1	3.8
c1355	742.0	672.8	3302.2	532.7	2817.5	1.9	212.4
c1908	864.0	1345.2	49030.6	767.9	3678.7	3.0	113.4
c2670	212.2	193.4	4911.4	707.8	1374.6	3.3	399.5
c3540	349.3	530.2	40906.3	1388.6	1309.4	1.7	370.0
c5315	227.1	265.9	3532.9	791.9	1093.6	1.8	178.1
c6288	71.6	52.3	7080.9	2216.6	428.2	1.3	1754.2
c7552	723.1	534.9	15016.3	732.5	8243.4	5.5	1753.6
<b>avg</b>	<b>397.6</b>	<b>429.5</b>	<b>13980.0</b>	<b>768.3</b>	<b>2104.8</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>486.2</b>

Table 5.10:  $N=3$  under 5-detect stuck-at patterns

ckt	# <i>fpttn</i>	# <i>eq(4) const</i>	# <i>fpt const</i>	# <i>n.f</i>	# <i>Nn.f</i>	# <i>Nsf</i>	<i>CPUtime</i>
c432	396.5	847.5	26064.0	195.0	5237.2	4.5	97.7
c499	398.7	336.1	2188.0	199.1	37501.7	3.3	182.8
c880	457.9	271.9	6887.6	219.6	1303.3	3.0	157.2
c1355	792.8	589.7	5698.9	570.8	9132.4	5.5	1052.7
c1908	235.5	313.5	11383.3	706.7	1770.4	2.9	477.2
c2670	253.5	196.4	6839.6	1096.4	799.5	2.6	377.0
c3540	97.5	56.4	7994.2	1399.3	54.2	1.6	819.9
c5315	342.7	649.7	6921.0	1080.1	5131.5	2.2	1074.3
c6288	133.8	32.6	14618.4	1687.9	1707.4	1.4	1302.4
c7552	259.6	109.2	3921.6	420.1	5226.1	5.4	1140.2
<b>avg</b>	<b>336.8</b>	<b>340.3</b>	<b>9251.7</b>	<b>757.5</b>	<b>6786.3</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>694.8</b>

Table 5.11:  $N=4$  under 5-detect stuck-at patterns

ckt	# <i>fpttn</i>	# <i>eq(4) const</i>	# <i>fpt const</i>	# <i>n.f</i>	# <i>Nn.f</i>	# <i>N.s.f</i>	<i>CPUtime</i>
c432	413.3	249.1	16230.4	201.6	3910.0	2.1	202.7
c499	421.5	383.6	5135.5	221.7	13060.6	2.8	561.1
c880	523.5	632.1	23413.1	306.4	11342.8	7.3	875.1
c1355	801.1	611.7	9922.0	562.5	10982.3	5.2	2031.8
c1908	351.4	492.3	6732.9	746.1	6089.1	3.2	1131.4
c2670	302.9	518.2	7671.7	1503.0	5266.2	4.0	953.3
c3540	114.7	203.1	62329.5	1529.3	4865.1	6.2	1722.6
c5315	486.2	492.0	18721.3	1277.1	6844.5	6.6	2218.0
c6288	522.1	63.7	187831.6	1913.2	29131.3	5.9	3862.9
c7552	430.1	183.5	37288.2	593.2	37079.4	8.5	2993.1
<b>avg</b>	<b>436.7</b>	<b>382.9</b>	<b>37527.6</b>	<b>885.4</b>	<b>12857.1</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>1655.2</b>

Table 5.12:  $N=5$  under 5-detect stuck-at patterns

ckt	# <i>fpttn</i>	# <i>eq(4) const</i>	# <i>fpt const</i>	# <i>n.f</i>	# <i>Nn.f</i>	# <i>Nsf</i>	<i>CPUtime</i>
c432	462.3	230.1	9235.3	187.1	1205.5	3.2	852.3
c499	452.2	329.3	6266.3	237.1	7264.1	3.7	1336.6
c880	544.3	583.2	22398.5	293.5	8883.2	4.4	927.3
c1355	793.2	620.2	10344.8	525.3	13532.6	5.2	4592.8
c1908	334.5	408.8	7295.5	662.6	3021.0	5.8	17032.6
c2670	329.0	493.3	7327.6	1341.3	1793.2	3.1	4319.3
c3540	122.2	221.6	43106.0	1472.4	2395.1	4.6	5192.2
c5315	493.2	526.4	13681.1	1362.3	5927.0	6.6	5036.3
c6288	502.3	48.0	73266.4	1966.3	39138.2	8.1	23152.5
c7552	428.9	200.3	36207.3	475.6	23962.2	6.9	20207.4
<b>avg</b>	<b>436.7</b>	<b>366.1</b>	<b>22912.8</b>	<b>848.6</b>	<b>10712.2</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>8264.9</b>




Figure 5.1: Net resolution

For example, as shown in Figure 5.4, suppose that four open-segment defects are injected. Segment  $f_1$  solely explain EPOs for pattern  $p_1$  and  $f_1, f_2$  and  $f_4$  jointly explain EPOs for  $p_2$ .  $f_2$  solely explains  $p_3$  and  $p_4$ , and  $f_3$  cannot explain any patterns. Because the defect on segment  $f_3$  and  $f_4$  cannot be observed through the entire simulation, only  $f_1$  and  $f_2$  are detectable. Therefore, if the given patterns can provide more constraints, the proposed approach can report the  $N$ -segment fault more precisely.

An open segment fault may not be observed from fault masking and fault covering. Fault masking means the fault is masked during propagation as shown in Figure 5.5(a). The fault cannot be observed from outputs in this case. Fault covering means the faults propagate to




Figure 5.2: Segment resolution

EPOs through the same subpaths as shown in Figure 5.5(b). Assuming that a fault  $F_A$  can cause EPOs  $EO_A$ , and fault  $F_B$  can cause EPOs  $EO_B$ . If  $EO_A \subset EO_B$ ,  $F_B$  is prompt to be considered as the real fault but not  $F_A$ . Although  $F_A$  is covered by  $F_B$ , we can diagnose  $F_B$ . Fault masking often results from logic masking during fault propagation for multiple stuck-at faults. For multiple open segment faults, fault masking may also results from fault activation. An open segment fault can inactivate another fault by affecting logic value of its coupling nets. This case represents more complex fault correlation for open segment fault. However, as long as the open segment faults can be traced from net fault generation, our approach can generate  $N$ -net faults correspondingly explain the output response.






Figure 5.3: Diagnosability


Pattern	f1	f2	f3	f4
p1	●			
p2	●	●		●
p3		●		
p4		●		

Never activated

Figure 5.4: Fault Detection According to Simulation Result



(a) fault masking



(b) fault covering


Figure 5.5: Fault Correlation

# Chapter 6

# Conclusion



The Byzantine effect makes faulty behavior due to an open segment nondeterministic and thus diagnosing multiple open-segment defects is more difficult than diagnosing a single one. Fault activation and propagation depends on both patterns and the physical information. In this paper, a three-stage diagnosis approach is proposed to generate rational  $N$ -segment fault as faults and consists of *net fault identification*,  *$N$ -net fault generation* and  *$N$ -segment fault composition*. We also discussed the technique we use to reduce the number of  $N$ -net fault generated from ILP solver. For each ISCAS85 circuits, experiments are conducted on 100 different samples with the random injection of 1 to 5 open segments under random patterns and 5-detect patterns. Final results show that the proposed approach can effectively generate a small number ( $<16$ ) of  $N$ -segment fault under random patterns and a smaller number ( $<9$ ) under 5-detect patterns for all ISCAS85 benchmark circuits. Results under 5-detect patterns also has higher diagnosability than under random patterns. It shows that higher pattern quality generates higher diagnosability. Therefore, diagnostic pattern generation for open segment fault helps to deal with the patter quality issue.



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