The relationship between composition of inside directors’ compensation and firm’s future performance: The influence of uncertainty

Abstract

內部董事屬於高階經營團隊的一員，亦是董事會成員之一。本文關注於內部董事的雙重角色以及當公司面臨高度不確定環境時，內部董事這兩種角色的薪酬比重對於公司未來績效之影響。本研究測試下列實證議題：(1) 內部董事的董事身分薪酬在不確定性較高的環境下是否比重較低；(2) 根據勾結理論，當不確定性較高時，董事身分薪酬對於公司未來績效是否呈現負向影響；(3) 本研究進一步考量董事長兼任總經理時，前述議題是否仍成立。本文實證結果發現：內部董事的董事身分薪酬在不確定性較高的環境下，比重較低。此外，不確定性較高，董事身分薪酬對於公司未來績效並沒有呈現負向影響：然而，當公司存在董事長兼任總經理時，董事身分薪酬對於公司未來績效會呈現負向影響。

Inside directors are an important part of a top management team’s (TMT’s) composition and are members of a firm’s board of directors. The research focuses on the dual roles of inside director and the effect of the proportion of compensation for inside directors’ dual roles on firm performance when the firm faces a highly uncertain environment. This study tests the following empirical issues: (1) whether the proportion of inside directors’ compensation for their director roles is lower under a more uncertain environment; (2) according to the cronyism perspective, when the degree of uncertainty the firm faces is high, whether the proportion of inside directors’ compensation for their director roles has a negative influence on firm performance; and (3) whether the aforementioned issues are still supported when there is CEO duality. The empirical results show that the proportion of inside directors’ compensation for their director roles is lower in a more uncertain environment. Moreover, when the degree of uncertainty the firm faces is high, the proportion of inside directors’ compensation for their director roles does not negatively influence firm performance, but when there is CEO duality, this proportion does negatively influence firm performance.